The nineteenth-century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz famously described war as the continuation of politics by other means. The status y of his claim remains a matter o f f great importance today. Western liberf als no longer see war as a normal means of settlin f g differences between states. Nevertheless, many o y f them f feel forced to conclude that sometimes war provides the only course of action for u y pholding international peace and security. It is therefore important that war remains a viable instrument of policy.
From this perspective it is unfortunate that, during the years since the death of Clausewitz, technolo f gical innovation undermined war's instrumental status. Rapid developments in the lethality o y f wea f pons permitted startling increases in war's destructive potential. As a result, the costs associated with resorting to armed force became increasingly likel y y t y o outweigh any conceivable y gains. For many, this trend reached its lo y y gical conclusion with the introduction of nuclear wea f pons. As nuclear arsenals grew, it became increasingly difficult to envisage policy goals that could justify the hundreds o y f millions o f f casualties -the overwhelmin f g majority of them civilians -that would have resulted f from war between the superpowers. In a world characterised by such rivalry, no realistic alternative to peace was evident.
Matters changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War, and the f realignment of international politics that f followed the collapse of the f Soviet Union. This realignment means that the chief threats to Western security now stem from strategic actors who do not possess nuclear weapons. The dangers of nuclear proli f feration remain a matter of conf cern but, as far as the influence of technology on warfare is concerned, attention is currently focused elsewhere. Indeed, it is the developments in information technologies (IT) that are now commanding much 133 attention from those who used to worry about nuclear weapons. And interestingly, t y y hese developments are widely believed to be recasting war into a more viable instrument of policy than at any time since 1945. A key reason for this is that the integration of advanced IT into militar f y systems is leading to remarkable improvements in accuracy, which in turn is considered to be producing a comparable decline in the collateral damage associated with their use. In other words, the application of I f T to warfare is understood to be producing a technical fix to the problem of civilian casualties in war f . In what follows, I want to suggest that this technical fix is unlikely to yield the kind of positive bene f fits that are widely anticipated. The destructive potential of contemporary war f fare cannot be fully addresse f f d by the application of further technology. What are also required ar f f e ways of exerting f political control over the strategic goals that are pursued with the aid of advanced weapon systems. It seems to me that such conf trol is possible, although prevailing Western views on military strategy constitute a barrier to success in this regard and need to be revised accordingly. In this respect, my position is similar to that advanced by Durodié (Chapter 9) elsewhere in this volume. Whilst we both perceive that technology can make a contribution to international peace and security, neither of us believes that this contribution will take the f form of a simple technical f fix. On the contrary, if technology is to play a f n effective role in this regard, its application must be subordinated to robust political processes.
By drawing a distinction between the political and technical domains in this manner, I am committing an act of simpli f fication. Constructivist accounts of technology point to the mutually constitutive nature of the political and technical, which renders efforts to disaggregate them problematic (see Chapter 2). Thus, judgements about whether a weapon 'works' or not -in the sense of destroying its target without causin f g undue collateral damage -are shaped by the political context of its us f e (what the war is about) in addition to the weapon's technical characteristics, such as accuracy and warhead size. By the same token, judgements about whether the risks to civilian life are justified by the anticipated benefits flowing from a target's destruction are partly shaped by technical factors. Both the Western Just War ethic and the Geneva Conventions stress the importance of acting proportionately and wit f h discrimination in war. On the other hand, neither provides the kind of 'felicific calculus' necessary to reach absolute judgements about what counts as sufficiently proportionate or discriminating. As such, considerations of technical feasibility en y joy wide sco y pe for shaping notions of
